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Abstract
An observer makes a number of observations of an industry producing a homoge-
neous good. Each observation consists of the market price, the output of individual
firms and perhaps information on each firm’s production cost. We provide vari-
ous tests (typically, linear programs) with which the observer can determine if the
data set is consistent with the hypothesis that firms in this industry are playing a
Cournot game at each observation. When cost information is wholly or partially
unavailable, these tests could potentially be used to derive cost information on the
firms. This paper is a contribution to the literature that aims to characterize (in
various contexts) the restrictions that a data set must satisfy for it to be consis-
tent with Nash outcomes in a game. It is also inspired by the seminal result of
Afriat (and the subsequent literature) which addresses similar issues in the context
of consumer demand, though one important technical difference from most of these
results is that the objective functions of firms in a Cournot game are not necessarily
quasiconcave.
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1. Introduction
Consider an industry with I firms producing a homogeneous good. We make T obser-
vations of this industry over time. If we assume that the cost functions of firms in the
industry do not vary across observations, so that the data is generated by fluctuations
in the market demand function, how could we test the hypothesis that the firms in this
industry are playing a Cournot game at each observation?
Suppose that the observation at t consists of the market price Pt and the output and
the production costs of each individual firm, Qi,t and Ci,t for every i. We wish to examine
the conditions under which such a data set can be rationalized as a Cournot game. By
this, we mean that we can find increasing, positive, and differentiable cost functions for
each firm (fixed across all observations) and differentiable and downward sloping demand
functions (one at each observation t) that give the observed outcome at each t as an
equilibrium of the Cournot game that results from the firms having these cost functions
and facing the demand function corresponding to that observation. It turns out that there
is (in essence) just one property on the data set, which we call the marginal property (M),
that is both necessary and sufficient for rationalizability. Property M requires that the
data set not reveal instances of over-production by firms. Specifically, suppose that at
time t firm i is producing more than at some other time t′, i.e., Qi,t > Qi,t′ . Then the
data must not reveal that the firm is better off at time t by reducing its output to Qi,t′ ;
i.e.,
PtQi,t′ − Ci,t′ < PtQi,t − Ci,t.
The right hand side of this inequality is firm i’s profit at time t if it produces Qi,t. This
is larger than the left hand side, which is an under-estimate of its profit at time t should
it reduce output to Qi,t′ . Note that the left hand side is an under-estimate because the
good’s clearing price will be higher than Pt if firm i reduces its output (assuming, of
course, that the market demand curve is downward sloping).
This result shows that there are observable restrictions on the Cournot model in this
context. However, property M is a rather weak restriction. Indeed if the firms are colluding
rather than playing a Cournot game, one can show that they will generate data that also
satisfies M, so that collusion does not lead to any observable behavior that is inconsistent
with the Cournot model. The main reason for this is that M is just a test that firms are
not over-producing – it does not test for under-production.
There are two reasons why the predictions of the Cournot model are so weak in this
context. Firstly, we assume that demand varies from one observation to the next and we
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do not restrict the manner in which they vary. This means that, in principle, the demand
curves at different observations may be completely unrelated to each other and, at each
observation, we observe just one point on the demand curve. This gives the observer
a great deal of freedom in choosing the demand curve to rationalize the data and thus,
loosely speaking, more sets of observations are rationalizable.
The other reason is related to the cost curves constructed for rationalizing the data.
We do not wish to limit the cost curves to a particular shape, for example, to those with
constant, increasing, or decreasing marginal costs, because this detracts from a test of the
Cournot model as such and, indeed, may well be directly contradicted by cost observations
itself. However, this absence of restrictions can introduce a troubling dichotomy between
observed and infinitesimal marginal costs, which we shall explain.
Suppose that for some firm i, the output below and closest to Qi,t was observed at
t′ and the output above and closest to Qi,t was observed at t′′. The data allow the
observer to calculate the average marginal cost of increasing output from Qi,t′ to Qi,t
(call it M ′) and from Qi,t to Qi,t′′ (call it M ′′). When rationalizing the observations,
a cost function C¯i must be constructed for this firm, that, amongst other things, will
generate average marginal costs of M ′ and M ′′ over the respective output ranges. On the
other hand, the observed output shares at t will impose restrictions on C¯ ′i(Qi,t), i.e., the
infinitesimal marginal cost at Qi,t, through the first-order conditions. Since C¯
′
i can vary
freely (apart from being continuous), there need be no relation between C¯ ′i(Qi,t), M
′, and
M ′′. Indeed, there are data sets that can only be rationalized via a cost function for which
the infinitesimal marginal cost at a point differs significantly from the observed marginal
costs over intervals adjacent to that point. The ‘oddness’ of such a rationalization is
most obvious when the observed average marginal costs (for discrete output changes) are
monotonically increasing or decreasing for some firm i. In these cases, the rationalizing
cost function for firm i may be such that its derivative (the marginal cost) does not display
the same monotonicity.
This suggests that it may be fruitful to refine the concept of rationalizability. We
say that a data set admits a convincing rationalization if it is rationalizable and the
constructed cost functions have the property that the infinitesimal marginal cost at each
observed output must lie between the observed marginal costs on either side of that point;
formally, we require C¯ ′i(Qi,t) to lie between M
′ and M ′′.1 This is really an assumption
1 Strictly speaking this is just one of two conditions imposed in our definition of convincing rational-
izability in Section 2, but it is this condition which leads to interesting implications. The other condition
is, in some sense, always satisfied.
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about the quality of the set of observations: we are assuming that it is rich enough for the
observed marginal costs to convey some information on the infinitesimal marginal costs.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which a convincing rationalization
exists. We also show, with an example, that the data set obtained from two colluding
firms need not admit a convincing rationalization as a Cournot game.2
The paper also examines the case where cost information is not observed, so that each
observation consists of just the market price and the output of each firm. In this case,
we show that any set of observations can be rationalized as a Cournot game. Whether
this result is surprising depends on one’s perspective. It does not seem surprising given
the meagerness of the information available to the observer; on the other hand, there are
some well-known facts about the Cournot game that may suggest otherwise.
Specifically, it is known (and trivial to check via the first order conditions) that firms’
market shares are inversely related to their marginal costs at any Cournot equilibrium.
This means that if every firm has constant marginal cost (so its cost function is linear
in output), then the ranking of firms according to market share does not vary with the
demand function. In other words, if at observation t, some firm i produces more than firm
j and at another observation t′, firm j produces more than firm i, then the modeler knows
that the observations are not consistent with a Cournot game with constant marginal
costs, even though costs are not directly observed. Of course, constant marginal costs
is a strong condition to impose on the cost functions, but there are similar observable
restrictions if all firms have nondecreasing marginal costs.3 In this paper, we elaborate
on these remarks by providing an example of a data set (of price and outputs) that is
not convincingly rationalizable; we also identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for
such a data set to admit a convincing rationalization.
Related literature. This paper is a contribution to the literature that tries to identify
the precise observable implications of various canonical economic models. Perhaps the
most influential paper in this approach is that of Afriat (1967). Afriat showed that a finite
2 It is clear that we could, if we wish, be more stringent or permissive when restricting the relationship
between observed and infinitesimal marginal costs. So, a weaker criterion is to require C¯ ′i(Qi,t) to be in
the interval [kmin{M ′,M ′′},K max{M ′,M ′′}], where 0 < k < 1 < K <∞, with k and K chosen by the
modeler. This does not affect the qualitative nature of our results on convincing rationalizability.
3 Consider an oligopoly where at observation t, firm i produces 20 and firm j produces 15. At
another observation t′, firm i produces 15 and firm j produces 16. Observation t tells us that C ′i(20) <
C ′j(15), while observation t
′ tells us that C ′i(15) > C
′
j(16). Clearly, either firm i or firm j cannot have
nondecreasing marginal costs. Note that this observable restriction is imposed solely on output levels.
We do not rely on cost – or even price – observations.
4
data set of price and demand observations is compatible with the utility-maximization
hypothesis if, and only if, there is solution to a linear program. This result has been
extended in various ways – for example, to production theory; see Varian (1982) – and
has also generated a very large empirical literature. Afriat’s result has also been extended
to the case of nonlinear, and possible nonconvex, budget sets (see Forges and Minelli
(2008) and Matzkin (1991)), where rationalization may require utility functions that are
not quasiconcave. By applying Afriat’s result, Brown and Matzkin (1996) show that
there are non-tautological conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a data set to be
consistent with Walrasian outcomes, in the context of an exchange economy; this work
has in turn been extended in a number of ways (see, for example, Kubler (2003), Carvajal
(2004, 2009) and, for a survey, Carvajal et al. (2004)). Our paper bears some resemblance
to these more recent contributions in its emphasis on nonconcave objective functions and
multi-agent interaction.
Perhaps the work that is most closely related to ours are those that address similar
issues in the context of games. Sprumont (2000) considers this question in the context
of a static game, and asks when observed actions can be rationalized as Nash equilbria.
Ray and Zhou (2001) address similar questions, but in the context of a dynamic game.
Carvajal (2005) shows how weak the testable implications of Nash equilibrium are in
games with continuous domains. In these papers, the variability in the data arises from
changes to the strategy set across observations.4 In our paper, we have chosen to focus on
a specific and familiar game. In our study of the Cournot game, the set of strategies do not
vary across observations. Instead, the observations are generated by changes to the payoff
functions, which in turn arises from changes in the demand function. Partly motivated
by earlier versions of this paper, Routledge (2009) has provided a nonparametric analysis
of the Bertrand game. It is clear that there are many extensions and variations on this
theme are potentially possible and worth studying, and also empirical work that can be
done based on the nonparametric approach.
Lastly, our paper is of course related to the very large empirical IO literature (surveyed
in Bresnahan (1989)) that, amongst other things, aims to determine the level of market
power (for example, Genesove and Mullin (1998)) or to derive cost information from
observed behavior under various game-theoretic assumptions. Our approach differs from
most of this literature in a number of ways. Many of these models are parametric and ours
4 Another related paper is Zhou (2005) which gives the precise restrictions on subsets of the strat-
egy space that could be rationalized as Nash equilibria of a two-player game with quasi-concave payoff
functions.
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is not. Secondly, our aim is to develop an exhaustive list of implications of a model, and not
just some testable implications. Lastly, we make no assumptions at all about the evolution
of demand across observations; we do this, not because we consider such assumptions
always undesirable, but because we think it is worthwhile asking if the Cournot hypothesis
yields any restrictions even without those assumptions.
Organization of paper. In Section 2, we consider the rationalizability problem for a
monopolist. This is a useful exercise because it helps to develop intuition for the results
in the Cournot case, and also because its results differ from that case in instructive ways.
From Section 3 onwards we consider the Cournot model. Section 3 studies rationalizability
and convincing rationalizability in a context where cost information is available to the
observer, while Section 4 studies the same issues but in a context where cost information
is (in part or in whole) unavailable. The final section discusses how the assumption that
cost functions are unchanged across observations can be relaxed; in particular, we extend
our results to accommodate linear perturbations to the cost function. Throughout the
paper we also develop results for rationalizability in the cases where marginal costs are
monotonic.
2. The Rationalizability Problem for a Monopoly
Consider an experiment in which we make T observations of a monopolist. The obser-
vations are indexed by t in the set T = {1, 2, . . . , T}; observation t consists of a triple
(Pt, Qt, Ct), respectively the price charged by the monopolist, the quantity it sells, and
the cost it incurs.5 We require Pt > 0 and Qt > 0 for all t and Ct′ > Ct whenever Qt′ > Qt
(so observed cost is higher if observed output is higher).
2.1. Rationalizable Observations
We say that the set of observations {(Pt, Qt, Ct)}t∈T is rationalizable if they are consistent
with a profit-maximizing monopolist having a stable cost structure, with each observation
corresponding to a different demand condition. Formally, we require that there be a C1
function C¯ : R+ → R and C1 functions P¯t : R+ → R, for each t in T , such that
5 For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that the firm incurs no fixed costs, or that the cost
we observe is the variable cost. This assumption restricts the datasets that can be rationalized, since
it implies that the observed cost can never be larger than the observed revenue. If we assume that the
observed cost is a mix of fixed and variable cost, the analysis will not be substantially different, but the
exposition of some results becomes more cumbersome.
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(i) C¯(q) ≥ 0 for q ≥ 0, with C¯(0) = 0, and C¯ ′(q) > 0;
(ii) P¯t(q) ≥ 0 and P¯ ′t(q) ≤ 0, with the the latter inequality being strict if P¯t(q) > 0;
(iii) C¯(Qt) = Ct and P¯t(Qt) = Pt; and
(iv) argmaxq≥0[P¯t(q)q − C¯(q)] = Qt.
Function C¯ is the monopolist’s cost function; condition (i) says that it is positive and
strictly increasing. Function P¯t is the inverse demand function at observation t; (ii) says
that more output can only be sold at a strictly lower price, until the price reaches zero.
Henceforth, we shall refer to any C1 cost function satisfying (i) as a regular cost function;
similarly, a regular inverse demand function is a C1 inverse demand function that obeys
(ii). Condition (iii) requires the inverse demand and cost functions to coincide with their
observed values at each t. Lastly, (iv) requires the observations to be consistent with
profit maximization. It is clear that (iii) and (iv) together guarantee that the observed
profit is the largest possible, i.e., PtQt − Ct = maxq≥0[P¯t(q)q − C¯(q)]. Since producing
nothing (and so incurring no cost) is always possible, rationality requires PtQt − Ct > 0.
We say that the observations are generic if Qt 6= Qt′ whenever t 6= t′.6 Let the set
{(Pt, Qt, Ct)}t∈T be a generic set of observations. For each t, we define the set
L(t) = {t′ ∈ T : Qt′ < Qt} ∪ {0}.
This means that L(t) consists of those observations with output levels lower than Qt, as
well as a fictitious observation 0, for which Q0 = 0. Note that for the observation with the
lowest output, we denote this observation by t∗, we have L(t∗) = {0} whilst for any t 6= t∗,
L(t) will contain Qt∗ , 0, and possibly other elements. We denote l(t) = argmaxt′∈L(t)Qt′ ;
that is, l(t) is the observation corresponding to the highest output level below Qt.
7 In
a similar fashion, we denote the observation with the highest output level by t∗∗. For
t 6= t∗∗, the set of observations with outputs higher than t is denoted by U(t), with
u(t) = argmint′∈U(t)Qt′ , so u(t) is the observation with the lowest output level above Qt.
For any t in T , define dQt = Qt−Ql(t) and dCt = Ct−Cl(t). In words, dCt is the extra
cost incurred by the monopoly when it increases its output from Ql(t) to Qt. We denote
the average marginal cost over that output range by Mt = dCt/dQt. The generic set of
observations {(Pt, Qt, Ct)}t∈T is said to obey the Marginal Property (henceforth, property
M) if for every t in T ,
PtQt′ − Ct′ < PtQt − Ct for all t′ ∈ L(t). (1)
6 This assumption simply makes the notation and exposition simpler. It has no analytical significance
and can be completely removed.
7 In particular, l(t∗) = 0.
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We may re-arrange this inequality to obtain
Ct − Ct′ =
∑
s∈(L(t)∪{t})\(L(t′)∪{t′})
dCs < Pt(Qt −Qt′) for all t′ ∈ L(t). (2)
Note that the observer does not know the exact market price of the product at time
t should the monopolist choose to produce Qt′ < Qt, but he knows that it must be at
least Pt. If Qt is optimal, the cost saving in producing at Qt′ rather than Qt must be
dominated by the revenue lost in producing at Qt′ rather than Qt; the latter does not
exceed Pt(Qt−Qt′), so we obtain (2).8 In short, property M requires that the monopolist
is not over-producing given the data. We state this result formally in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The generic set of observations {(Pt, Qt, Ct)}t∈T is rationalizable only
if it obeys M.
The next result says that M is also sufficient for rationalizability.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the generic set of observations {(Pt, Qt, Ct)}t∈T obeys M,
and let {δt}t∈T be a set of numbers satisfying 0 < δt < Pt. Then, the set of observations
are rationalizable and the cost function C¯ can be chosen such that C¯ ′(Qt) = δt for all
t ∈ T .
Note that the last condition in Proposition 2 says that we are free to choose the
marginal cost at the optimal output level, subject to it being lower than the observed
price. The extent to which we may freely choose the marginal cost at any observed output
level turns out to be a crucial issue, as we shall see when we consider rationalizability in
the Cournot model.
Since property M is a ‘one-sided’ condition – it requires that the monopoly is not over-
producing given the data – Proposition 2 effectively says that the data does not permit
the observer to check that the monopolist is not under-producing. The reason for this is
that the monopolist decision at observation t to produce Qt, but not more, can always
be justified on the grounds that the price will fall (arbitrarily) sharply should it produce
more. The fact that the demand curve changes from one observation to the next, and the
fact that only one observation is made at each demand curve, mean that such a possibility
cannot be excluded by the observer.
8 Note that the set (L(t) ∪ {t}) \ (L(t′) ∪ {t′}) consists of those observations with output levels that
are weakly below Qt and strictly above Qt′ .
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Proposition 2 follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 below. Loosely speaking, Lemma 1 pro-
vides us with the cost function needed to rationalize the set of observations, while Lemma
2 gives the demand functions corresponding to each observation.
Lemma 1. Suppose the generic set of observations {(Pt, Qt, Ct)}t∈T obeys M, and let
{δt}t∈T be a set of numbers satisfying 0 < δt < Pt. Then, there is a regular cost function
C¯ : R+ → R such that, for all t in T ,
(i) C¯(Qt) = Ct;
(ii) C¯ ′(Qt) = δt; and
(iii) for all q ∈ [0, Qt),
Ptq − C¯(q) < PtQt − C¯(Qt). (3)
Proof: Note that the inequality (3) may be re-written as
C¯(q) > Pt(q −Qt) + C¯(Qt). (4)
The function ft(q) = Pt(q −Qt) + Ct, for q in [0, Qt), is represented by a line with slope
Pt passing through the point (Qt, Ct) – see Figure 1. Condition M guarantees that for
t′ in L(t), (Qt′ , Ct′) lies above the line ft. We require a cost function that satisfies (4).
One such function is the one given by the linear interpolation of all the points (Qt, Ct),
since its graph stays above every one of the lines representing the functions ft. This cost
function can in turn be replaced by a smooth function where the derivative at Qt is δt,
since δt < Pt and the latter is the slope of ft. Q.E.D.
Let C¯ be a cost function that is consistent with {Ct}t∈T in the sense that C¯(Qt) = Ct
for all t. We say that its marginal cost function C¯ ′ has minimal variation (or that it varies
minimally) if the following is true for all t ∈ T :
(i) if Mt lies strictly between C¯
′(Qt) and C¯ ′(Ql(t)), then C¯ ′ is either strictly increasing or
strictly decreasing in the interval [Ql(t), Qt];
(ii) if Mt = C¯
′(Qt) = C¯ ′(Ql(t)), then C¯ ′ is constant in [Ql(t), Qt]; and
(iii) if neither of the previous premises in (i) and (ii) are true, then C¯ ′ has exactly one
turning point in [Ql(t), Qt].
9
Remark: It is clear form Figure 1 that C¯ in Lemma Lemma 1 can be chosen with C¯ ′(0)
taking any value. It is also clear that C¯ ′ can be chosen to be of minimal variation, given
9 Note that in the last case, C¯ ′ needs at least one turning point for it to be consistent with the data,
i.e., for
∫ Q(t)
Ql(t)
C¯ ′(q) dq to equal Mt(Qt −Ql(t)).
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∠(p1)
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Figure 1: Construction of a Cost Function. The notation ∠(δ) is used to denote the
slope (δ) at a point on the curve or of a line. The straight, thin lines represent the functions
ft(q) = Ct + Pt(q −Qt). Condition M guarantees that if Qt′ < Qt, then (Qt′ , Ct′) lies above the
graph of ft.
the values of C¯ ′(Qt) (for t ∈ T ∪ {0}).
Properties (i) and (ii) in Lemma 1 require the cost function to agree with the cost
data at the observed output levels and to obey the specified marginal cost conditions.
Property (iii) is a strengthening of condition M: M requires (3) to hold at discrete output
levels, while (iii) requires it to hold at all output levels up to Qt.
The next result says that, for the cost function guaranteed by Lemma 1, we could find
a regular inverse demand function at each observation t such that the profit-maximizing
output decision is Qt. It is clear that Lemmas 1 and 2 together guarantee Proposition 2.
Lemma 2. Let {δt}t∈T be a set of numbers satisfying 0 < δt < Pt, and let C¯ : R+ → R be
a regular cost function satisfying the three properties of Lemma 1. Then, for any t ∈ T ,
there is a regular inverse demand function P¯t : R+ → R such that
(i) P¯t(Qt) = Pt; and
(ii) argmaxq≥0 [¯P¯t(q)q − C¯(q)] = Qt.
The proof of this lemma is in the Appendix, but the result is very intuitive. The
lemma requires that we produce an inverse demand function. Property (iii) in Lemma 1
already provides us with one such function that obeys (i) and (ii) in Lemma 2: simply
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assume that P¯t(q) = Pt for all q ≤ Qt and P¯t(q) = 0 for q > Qt. This function is not
regular, but we can always construct a regular demand function that is sufficiently close
to it so that (i) and (ii) (in Lemma 2) remain valid.
2.2. The Convincing Criterion
The cost function C¯ is consistent with the data in the sense that it agrees with the
observed costs at the output levels Qt (for all t ∈ T ). Note, however, that this restriction
is very permissive: amongst other things, it does not restrict the relationship between
infinitesimal marginal costs C¯ ′ and the observed marginal costs. This problem is most
obvious when observed marginal costs are monotonic. Formally, we say that the observed
costs are consistent with increasing marginal costs if for all t 6= t∗, it is observed that
Mt > Ml(t). Similarly, observed costs are consistent with decreasing marginal costs if
for all t 6= t∗, it is observed that Mt < Ml(t), and they are consistent with constant
marginal costs if Mt = Mt′ for all t and t
′. If (say) we observe that marginal costs are
consistent with increasing marginal costs, then it is reasonable to require that C¯ also
display increasing marginal costs at all output levels (i.e., that C¯ ′(q) be increasing in
q). So, a rationalizing cost function with this property is more convincing than another
rationalizing cost function that does not possess this property. More generally, it is
desirable to have a rationalizing cost function such that C¯ ′ adheres more closely to the
pattern displayed by {Mt}t∈T .
This motivates our introduction of a convincing criterion on the rationalizing cost
function C¯. This criterion is satisfied if, in addition to all the conditions already imposed
on C¯ by rationalizability (and, in particular, that C¯(Qt) = Ct), the following conditions
hold:
(C1) for all t 6= t∗∗, C¯ ′(Qt) lies between Mt and Mu(t);
(C2) the marginal cost C¯ ′ varies minimally.
Condition (C1) says that the (infinitesimal) marginal cost at Qt lies between the average
marginal costs observed over the intervals [l(t), t] and [t, u(t)], while (C2) say that the
marginal cost function does not ‘wiggle’ more than is necessary to be consistent with the
data and to satisfy condition (C1). Figures 2 and 3 give examples of situations where the
criterion is violated and where it is satisfied. It is easy to check that if the rationalizing
function C¯ has increasing marginal cost, then it must satisfy the convincing criterion
(relative to the finite cost observations it rationalizes). Similarly, if C¯ has constant or
decreasing marginal cost, then it will also satisfy the convincing criterion.
In the case of a monopoly, the convincing criterion has no observable implications.
11
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By this we mean that any set of observations that is rationalizable in this context is also
convincingly rationalizable, in the sense that the cost function can be chosen to satisfy
the convincing criterion.
Proposition 3. Any generic set of observations {(Pt, Qt, Ct)}t∈T that obeys property M
is rationalizable with a rationalizing cost function C¯ that satisfies the convincing criterion.
Furthermore, if the cost observations are consistent with increasing (resp. constant, resp.
decreasing) marginal costs, then C¯ can be chosen such that C¯ ′ is increasing (resp. constant,
resp. decreasing).
Proof: Proposition 2 says that C¯ can be chosen such that C¯ ′(Qt) = δt, for any δt in
(0, Pt). Note, from (2), choosing t
′ = l(t), that Mt < Pt, so we can certainly choose δt
to be in (0, Pt) and also to lie between Mt and Mu(t) (for any t 6= t∗∗), thus ensuring
that (C1) is satisfied. Furthermore, as we had pointed in the remark following Lemma
1, C¯ may be chosen so that its marginal cost varies minimally, in addition to satisfying
conditions (i)-(iii).
Consider now the case where the observations are consistent with increasing marginal
cost.10 Since Mt > Ml(t) for all t 6= t∗, we can choose δt to lie in the interval (Mt,Mu(t))
for t 6= t∗∗. For t = t∗∗, choose δt∗∗ > Mt∗∗ and for t = 0 choose δ0 < Mt∗ . The remark
following Lemma 1 points out that the rationalizing cost function can be chosen such that
C¯ ′ varies minimally. Since Mt ∈ (δl(t), δt) for all t, it follows from the definition of minimal
variation that C¯ ′ is increasing. Q.E.D.
As we shall see in the next sections, the equivalence between rationalizability and
convincing rationalizability breaks down in a multi-firm context.
3. Cournot Rationalizability
An industry consists of I firms producing a homogeneous good; we denote the set of firms
by I = {1, 2, . . . , I}. Consider an experiment in which T observations are made of this
industry. As in the previous section, we index the observations by t in T = {1, 2, . . . , T}.
For each t, the industry price Pt, the output of each firm (Qi,t)i∈I and the cost it incurs
(Ci,t)i∈I are observed. We require Pt > 0 and Qi,t > 0 for all t, Ci,t′ > Ci,t whenever
Qi,t′ > Qi,t, and also that PtQi,t − Ci,t > 0. We let Qt =
∑
i∈I Qi,t denote the aggregate
output of the industry at observation t.
10 The arguments for the decreasing and constant marginal cost cases are similar.
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3.1. Rationalizable Observations
We say that the set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is Cournot rationalizable
if each observation can be explained as a Cournot equilibrium arising from a different
market demand function, keeping the cost function of each firm fixed across observations.
Formally, we require that there be a regular cost function C¯i : R+ → R for each firm i
and a regular demand function P¯t : R+ → R for each t, such that
(i) C¯i(Qi,t) = Ci,t and P¯t(Qt) = Pt; and
(ii) argmaxqi≥0[qiP¯t(qi +
∑
j 6=iQj,t)− C¯i(qi)] = Qi,t.
Condition (i) says that the inverse demand and cost functions must coincide with their
observed values at each t. Condition (ii) says that, at each observation t, firm i’s observed
output level Qi,t maximizes its profit given the output of the other firms.
We say that the observations are generic if, for every firm i, we have Qi,t 6= Qi,t′
whenever t 6= t′. Let {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T be a generic set of observations. For
each firm i, we may define Li, li, ui, t
∗
i , t
∗∗
i , and Mi,t, in a way analogous to our definitions
in Section 2. We say that the observations obey the marginal property if, for every firm
i, {(Pt, Qi,t, Ci,t)}t∈T obeys property M; formally, for every t in T , we require
Ci,t − Ci,t′ =
∑
s∈(Li(t)∪{t})\(Li(t′)∪{t′})
Mi,s(Qi,s −Qi,l(s)) < Pt(Qt −Qt′) for t′ ∈ Li(t). (5)
For exactly the same reason as the one given in the monopoly case, property M is
necessary for a set of observations to be Cournot rationalizable; specifically, M guarantees
that each firm is not better off by producing less than the observed output. The next
result says that M is also sufficient for Cournot rationalizability.
Theorem 1. A generic set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is Cournot ratio-
nalizable if, and only if, it obeys property M.
Just as Proposition 2 follows from Lemmas 1 and 2, we can prove Theorem 1 with a
similar two-step procedure. The next result is analogous to Lemma 1; the construction
of the cost functions in this result is also identical to that in Lemma 1, so we shall omit
its proof.
Lemma 3. Let {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T be a generic set of observations obeying M and
suppose that the positive numbers {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T satisfy 0 < δi,t < Pt, for all (i, t). Then,
there are regular cost functions C¯i : R+ → R such that
(i) C¯i(Qi,t) = Ci,t;
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(ii) C¯ ′i(Qi,t) = δi,t; and
(iii) for all qi in [0, Qi,t),
Ptqi − C¯i(qi) < PtQi,t − C¯i(Qi,t). (6)
Furthermore, C¯i may be chosen such that C¯
′
i(0) = δi,0 for any δi,0 > 0 and that C¯
′
i varies
minimally.
To motivate the next result, note that if firm i is playing its best response for demand
function P¯t and cost function C¯i, then it satisfies the first order condition
P¯ ′t(Qt)Qi,t + Pt = C¯
′
i(Qi,t). (7)
It follows that
−P¯ ′t(Qt) =
Pt − C¯ ′1(Q1,t)
Q1,t
=
Pt − C¯ ′2(Q2,t)
Q2,t
= . . . =
Pt − C¯ ′I(QI,t)
QI,t
. (8)
This accounts for the condition imposed on the cost functions in the next result, which is
loosely analogous to Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Let {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T be a set of positive numbers satisfying
Pt − δ1,t
Q1,t
=
Pt − δ2,t
Q2,t
= . . . =
Pt − δI,t
QI,t
> 0 for each t ∈ T (9)
and suppose that the cost functions C¯i : R+ → R satisfy properties (i)-(iii) in Lemma 3.
Then, there are regular demand functions P¯t : R+ → R such that, P¯t(
∑
i∈I Qi,t) = Pt and,
for every firm i,
argmaxqi≥0[qiP¯t(qi +
∑
j 6=i
Qj,t)− C¯i(qi)] = Qi,t.
The proof of this lemma is deferred to the Appendix.
It is important to notice that for any Pt and {Qi,t}i∈I there always exist positive
numbers {δi,t}i∈I such that equation (9) holds. Suppose that firm k produces more than
any other firm at observation t, i.e., Qk,t ≥ Qi,t for all i in I. Let δk,t be any positive
number smaller than Pt, and define β = (Pt − δk,t)/Qk,t. Then,
δi,t := Pt − βQi,t ≥ Pt − βQk,t = δk,t > 0.
It follows immediately from this observation that Lemmas 3 and 4 together establish
Theorem 1.
Like Proposition 2, Theorem 1 has the feature that it only checks that each firm
in the Cournot oligopoly is not over-producing, but it does not test that there is no
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under-production. Indeed, property M is sufficiently weak that there are other reasonable
scenarios of firm interaction under which it will also be satisfied. In particular, M holds
if the firms are colluding to maximize total profits: this means that their collusion will
never generate any evidence that is contrary to Cournot rationalizability.
To state this claim formally, we define a set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T
as being consistent with collusion if there is a regular cost function C˜i : R+ → R for each
firm i and a regular demand function P˜t : R+ → R for each t, such that
(i) C˜i(Qi,t) = Ci,t and P˜t(Qt) = Pt; and
(ii) argmax(qi)i∈I≥0
[
(
∑
i∈I qi)P˜t(
∑
i∈I qi)−
∑
i∈I C˜i(qi)
]
= (Qi,t)i∈I .
Condition (i) requires that the cost and inverse demand functions agree with the data
while (ii) says that, at each observation t, the observed output distribution across firms
must maximize total profit.
Proposition 4. The generic set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is consistent
with collusion only if it obeys M.
Proof: We denote the profit of firm i at observation t by Πi,t. Suppose that there is
collusion but M is violated, so for some firm k, observation t, and t′ ∈ Lk(t),
PtQk,t′ − Ck,t′ ≥ PtQk,t − Ck,t = Πk,t.
By definition, Qk,t′ < Qk,t, so P˜t(Qk,t′ +
∑
j 6=kQj,t) > Pt. This implies that
P˜t
(
Qk,t′ +
∑
j 6=k
Qj,t
)
Qk,t′ − C˜k(Qk,t′) > Πk,t, (10)
whereas for every i 6= k,
P˜t
(
Qk,t′ +
∑
j 6=k
Qj,t
)
Qi,t − C˜i(Qi,t) > Πi,t. (11)
In other words, both k and all other firms are strictly better off if k reduces its output
(with the other firms benefitting from the higher market price). Clearly, the output vector
(Qi,t)i∈I does not maximize total industry profit at t, so collusion is excluded. Q.E.D.
3.2. Convincingly Rationalizable Observations
The set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is said to admit a convincing Cournot
rationalization (or to be convincingly Cournot rationalizable) if it is Cournot rationaliz-
able and, for each firm i, the rationalizing cost function C¯i can be chosen to satisfy the
convincing criterion. The next result gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a data
set to admit a convincing rationalization.
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Theorem 2. A generic set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T admits a convinc-
ing Cournot rationalization if, and only if, it obeys property M and there exists positive
scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T that satisfy (9) and
δi,t lies between Mi,t and Mi,ui(t) for all t 6= t∗∗i . (12)
Proof: Suppose that {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is convincingly Cournot rationalizable.
Theorem 1 tells us that M holds. Choosing δi,t = C¯
′
i(Qi,t), (9) follows from (8) and (12)
follows from condition (C1) of the convincing criterion.
Conversely, suppose M holds and there exist positive scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T satisfying
(9) and (12). Lemma 3 guarantees that there is C¯i satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) in that
lemma and condition (C2) of the convincing criterion. Furthermore, because of (12), C¯i
will also satisfy condition (C1) of the convincing criterion. Finally, Lemma 4 guarantees
that a convincing rationalization exists. Q.E.D.
Remark: If {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T exists that satisfies the conditions stated in this theorem, then
the rationalizing cost function for firm i may be chosen to satisfy C¯ ′i(Qi,t) = δi,t, with
C¯ ′i(0) taking on any positive value.
This result says that convincing Cournot rationalizability is equivalent to three condi-
tions that (loosely speaking) perform three distinct roles: property M provides the justifi-
cation for the global optimality of the observed output choices; condition (9) provides the
justification for local optimality; and condition (12) guarantees that these justifications
are convincingly related to each other. Note that condition M can be directly checked,
while the existence of {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T obeying (9) and (12) is a linear programming problem,
so the test proposed by Theorem 2 can be solved.11
In the single-firm setting considered in the last section, we concluded that a data set
is rationalizable if and only if it is convincingly rationalizable. We claim that this is
not the case in the multi-firm context of this section. Since it is always possible to find
{δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T that obey (9), we are effectively claiming that there are data sets for which
(9) and (12) cannot be simultaneously satisfied. For such a data set, any rationalization
will involve some firm j having a rationalizing cost function C¯j that violates the convincing
criterion. Indeed, because (12) is violated, we know that C¯j violates condition (C1) at
some observed output Qj,t. We shall give an example of this phenomenon in the next
section.
11By this we mean that there is a procedure for determining, in a finite number of steps, whether this
problem admits a solution.
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In those situations where a firm has cost observations that are consistent with increas-
ing, decreasing, or constant marginal cost, the modeler may wish to find a rationalizing
cost function that displays the same behavior at all output levels. The next result, which
is a slight variant of Theorem 2, provides the linear program for determining if such a
rationalization is possible.
Theorem 3. Let {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ci,t)i∈I ]}t∈T be a generic set of observations and suppose
that all firms in J ⊆ I have cost observations that are consistent with increasing marginal
cost. Then the following conditions on the data set are equivalent:
[A]. It admits a Cournot rationalization such that the rationalizing cost function for every
firm j in J has increasing marginal cost, i.e., C¯ ′j(q) increases with q.
[B]. It obeys property M and there exists positive scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T satisfying (9), with
Mi,t < δi,t < Mi,ui(t) for all t 6= t∗∗i and (13)
δi,t∗∗i > Mi,t∗∗i . (14)
Proof: That [A] implies [B] is easy to see. By Theorem 2, since the data set admits a
Cournot rationalization, it must obey M and (9) is satisfied if δi,t = C¯
′
i(Qi,t). For firms in
J , C¯ ′j is increasing, in which case (13) and (14) must hold.
Suppose that [B] holds; Lemma 3 guarantees that there is C¯i satisfying conditions
(i)-(iii) in that lemma. Furthermore the rationalizing cost functions C¯j (for j ∈ J ) can
be chosen to satisfy the convincing criterion (because of (13)). We may also require
C¯ ′j(0) = δj,0 < Mj,t∗ for j ∈ J ; this condition, together with (13) and (14), imply that
Mj,t lies strictly between δj,t and δj,lj(t) for all t. Therefore, condition (C2) of the con-
vincing criterion says that C¯ ′j is strictly increasing for all q. Finally, Lemma 4 guarantees
that a rationalization exists. Q.E.D.
Note that there are some fairly obvious variations on Theorem 3. If the cost obser-
vations of the firms in J are consistent with decreasing marginal costs and we wish C¯j
to have the same property, then the necessary and sufficient conditions will involve (13)
and (14), but with the inequalities reversed. If the cost observations of firms in J are
consistent with constant marginal cost, then the necessary and sufficient conditions will
involve replacing (13) and (14) with δi,t = Mi,t for all t. (Note that in this case Mi,t = Mi,t′
for any t and t′.) It is also possible to mix-and-match conditions. For example, if the cost
observations of firms in J1 are consistent with increasing marginal cost and the cost ob-
servations of firms in J2 are consistent with decreasing marginal costs, with all other firms
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displaying neither pattern, then by applying the relevant restrictions on δi,t for each firm,
we could test whether there is a rationalization in which firms in J1 have cost functions
with increasing marginal costs, firms in J2 have decreasing marginal costs, and firms in
I \ (J1 ∪ J2) have cost functions that satisfy the convincing criterion.
4. Cournot Rationalizability Without Observing Costs
In this section, we consider the problem of Cournot rationalizability under the assumption
that the costs incurred by each firm are not observed. Formally, the set of observations
reduces to {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T . This data set is said to be generic if Qi,t′ 6= Qi,t whenever
t 6= t′; it is Cournot rationalizable if we can find a regular demand function, P¯t, for each
observation t, and a regular cost function, C¯i, for each firm i, such that
(i) P¯t(
∑
i∈I Qi,t) = Pt; and
(ii) argmaxqi≥0[qiP¯t(qi +
∑
j 6=iQj,t)− C¯i(Qi)] = Qi,t.
In words, the t-th observation, [Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ], is the Cournot outcome when each firm i
has cost function C¯i and the market inverse demand function is P¯t.
4.1. Rationalizability and the Convincing Criterion
The following result says that Cournot competition imposes no restriction on the obser-
vations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T .
Corollary 1. Any generic set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T , is Cournot rational-
izable.
Proof: By Theorem 1, it suffices that we find an array of individual costs, {Ci,t}(i,t)∈I×T ,
that, when added to the observed data, gives a set of observations that obeys M. Equiv-
alently, we need to find {Mi,t}(i,t)∈I×T that obeys (5). But since the right end of that
inequality is always positive and bounded away from zero for any t and t′, it is clear that
(5) holds if Mi,t is sufficiently small. Q.E.D.
The next question we should ask is obvious: under what conditions is {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T
convincingly rationalizable? By this we mean that the cost functions C¯i must satisfy the
convincing criterion, i.e., conditions (C1) and (C2), where
Mi,t =
∫ Qi,t
Qi,li(t)
C¯ ′(qi) dqi
Qi,t −Qi,li(t)
, (15)
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in addition to the conditions imposed by rationalizability. The next result follows from
Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. A generic set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is convincingly Cournot
rationalizable if, and only if, the following three conditions are satisfied:
(a) there exists positive scalars {∆i,t}(i,t)∈I×T such that, for each firm i and observation
t, ∑
s∈(Li(t)∪{t})\(Li(t′)∪{t′})
∆i,s
(
Qi,s −Qi,l(s)
)
< Pt(Qt −Qt′) for t′ ∈ Li(t); (16)
(b) there exists positive scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T that satisfy (9); and
(c) for all t 6= t∗∗i ,
δi,t lies between ∆i,t and ∆i,ui(t). (17)
Proof: Suppose that {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is convincingly Cournot rationalizable. Set δi,t =
C¯i(Qi,t) and ∆i,t equal to the right hand side of (15); then (a) and (b) holds because of
(5) and (8) respectively. Finally, since the observations are convincingly rationalizable,
(17) must also hold.
For the other direction, since (a) holds we may (fictitiously) assume that cost is ob-
servable, with
Ci,t =
∑
s∈(Li(t)∪{t})\{0}
δi,s
(
Qi,s −Qi,li(s)
)
. (18)
Then (16) is just property M (see Equation (5)). By Theorem 2, we know that (a), (b),
and (c) guarantee that the set of observations is convincingly rationalizable. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4 says that to determine if {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is convincingly rationalizable
we need to find ∆i,t and δi,t (for (i, t) ∈ I × T ) obeying conditions (a) to (c). Conditions
(a) and (b) are linear conditions, but condition (c) is nonlinear, so this is no longer a
linear programming problem.12 However, it is clear that the problem is solvable, because
it can always be broken up into a finite collection of linear programs. To see this, add
the condition ∆i,t ≤ ∆i,u(t), so condition (c) can be written as ∆i,t ≤ δi,t ≤ ∆i,u(t), which
is a linear condition. Alternatively, introduce the condition ∆i,t ≥ ∆i,u(t), so that (c) can
be written as ∆i,t ≥ δi,t ≥ ∆i,u(t), which is another linear condition. Since there are only
finitely many such (additional and linear) conditions on ∆i,t, we obtain a finite number
of linear programs, each of which is solvable.13
12 Notice the difference between (12) and (17). In the former, the bounds on δi,t are obtained from
the data while in the latter they are part of the solution to the program.
13 Note that we are simply making an argument to establish the solvability of the problem. In an actual
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Table 1: Data that cannot be convincingly rationalized.
t Pt Q1t Q2t
1 2 40 90
2 10 50 100
3 1.5 60 110
Echoing something we said earlier in relation to Theorem 2, the conditions (a), (b),
and (c) in Theorem 4 can be seen as ensuring three different aspects of a convincing
rationalization. Condition (a) guarantees that Qi,t is superior to other output choices far
away; condition (b) guarantees that Qi,t is locally optimal; and condition (c) guarantees
that the values of ∆i,t and δi,t obtained to satisfy (a) and (b) are related to each other in
a convincing way.
We now turn to the issue that we raised in the previous section but did not resolve,
i.e., that there do exist observations that are rationalizable but not convincingly rational-
izable. If this is not the case, Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 will have no content. Consider
the observations recorded in Table 1, which gives the prices and outputs for a duopoly.
Corollary 1 says that any data set of prices and output is Cournot rationalizable, so this
is certainly true of the observations in Table 1. However, we claim that these observations
are not convincingly rationalizable.
Suppose instead that it is. By (8), C¯ ′1(Q1,t) = Pt−
[
Pt − C¯ ′2(Q2,t)
]
Q1,t/Q2,t. Therefore,
C¯ ′1(Q1,t) ≥ Pt
[
1− Q1,t
Q2,t
]
.
From observation t = 2, we obtain C¯ ′1(50) ≥ 5. By the convincing criterion (specifically,
(C1)), the average marginal cost (for firm 1) of either increasing production from 40 to
50 or from 50 to 60 must be at least 5. The observed output at t = 3 is 60, so the cost
of raising output from 40 to 60 is at least 5× 10 = 50. On the other hand, the increased
revenue that firm 1 earns by raising output from 40 to 60 is no more than 1.5× 20 = 30,
which means that the firm is better off producing at 40 rather than 60 at t = 3. We
conclude that the data in Table 1 is not convincingly rationalizable.
application with a large data set, it may be necessary to have an algorithm that is more computationally
efficient. The programming problem we have here is an example of a problem in disjunctive programming,
because we wish to determine if there is a solution to any one of a finite collection of linear programs.
Mixed integer programming methods are potentially useful for this purpose.
21
It is worth emphasizing the role played by the convincing criterion in this argument:
it is used to extend the lower bound on C¯ ′1(50) obtained through a first-order condition
to some non-infinitesimal interval. Without such a criterion, the value of C¯ ′1(50)) will
have nothing to say about the marginal cost of any discrete change in output. Note also
that if the modeler makes an a priori assumption that marginal cost is monotonic, that
assumption will have a similar (indeed even more powerful) impact: if marginal cost is
increasing, then the lower bound on marginal cost obtained at output 50 can be extended
to all output levels above 50 and if marginal cost is decreasing, then the lower bound
obtained at 50 can be extended to all output levels below 50.
4.2. Collusion
Note that while the observations in Table 1 are not convincingly rationalizable as Cournot
outcomes, they can be rationalized as collusive outcomes. Indeed, any set of observations
can be rationalized as a set of collusive outcomes in which all firms have constant and
identical marginal costs. This is an easy consequence of our results in Section 2; in
the result below, every firm should be interpreted as having the identical cost function
C¯(q) = q.
Corollary 2. For any generic set of observations {(Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I)}t∈T , there is  > 0 and
regular inverse demand functions P˜t : R+ → R for each t, such that, for every t,
(Qi,t)i∈I ∈ argmax(qi)i∈I≥0
[(∑
i∈I
qi
)
P˜t
(∑
i∈I
qi
)
− 
(∑
i∈I
qi
)]
.
Proof: Suppose that each firm has the cost function C¯(q) = q. Then every output
allocation is cost efficient and if the firms are colluding, they must act like a monopoly
with the same cost function C¯. Choose  sufficiently close to zero so that conditions (i),
(ii), (iii) in Lemma 1 are satisfied, where Qt =
∑
i∈I Qi,t. The existence of Pt is guaranteed
by Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
4.3. Other Restrictions on Cost Functions
The convincing criterion is just one of many restrictions that a modeler may wish to im-
pose on the rationalizing cost functions in the event that cost information is unavailable
or incompletely available. These restrictions can be imposed, instead of or in addition
to, the convincing criterion. We discuss some of these briefly. To keep the exposition
simple, we assume that any restriction we consider is imposed on all firms in the industry,
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though the reader should bear in mind that it is possible to mix-and-match by imposing
different restrictions on different firms or multiple restrictions on any firm. Note also that
all the restrictions are refutable in the sense that one can construct data sets which are
not jointly consistent with these cost restrictions and Cournot rationalizability.
(1) Nondecreasing Marginal Costs. Suppose that some firm j has nondecreasing
marginal costs. In this case, if a Cournot rationalization exists, it must be possible for
{δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T to be chosen such that, in addition to the conditions (9), we also have
δj,t′ ≥ δj,t whenever Qj,t′ > Qj,t. (19)
This is clear since we know that δj,t can be chosen to equal C¯
′
j(Qj,t). The next result
gives necessary and sufficient conditions under which a data set of prices and quantities is
rationalizable as Cournot outcomes and with all firms having increasing marginal costs.
Note that, unlike Theorem 4, this result has no conditions explicitly involving ∆j,t. As will
be clear from the proof, the existence of ∆j,t obeying (16) is guaranteed by the (19). This
is analogous to the fact that in concave optimization problems, local optimality implies
global optimality.
Theorem 5. Let {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I ]}t∈T be a generic set of observations. Then the following
conditions on the data set are equivalent:
[A] It admits a Cournot rationalization such that the rationalizing cost functions have
nondecreasing marginal costs, i.e., for every firm i, C¯ ′i(q) is nondecreasing in q.
[B]. There exists positive scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T that satisfy (9) and (19).
Proof: Setting δi,t = C¯
′
i(Qi,t) it is clear that [A] implies [B]. Now suppose that [B] holds.
Choose δi,0 to be some positive number lower than δi,t∗i and then ∆i,t to be some number
in the interval (δi,li(t), δi,t) if δi,li(t) 6= δi,t and ∆i,t = δi,t otherwise (for all t ∈ T ). Since δi,t
is nondecreasing with Qi,t, so is ∆i,t. Therefore, for s in Li(t),
∆i,s ≤ ∆i,t ≤ δi,t < Pt.
It follows that (16) is satisfied. Defining Ci,t by (18), (16) is just property M (see (5)).
Lemma 3 guarantees that, for every firm i, there is C¯i that has minimal variation and
satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) in that lemma. In this case, minimal variation means that C¯ ′i
is weakly increasing in q, with C¯ ′i constant on any interval [Qi,li(t), Qi,t] where δi,li(t) = δi,t
and with C¯ ′i increasing on any interval [Qi,li(t), Qi,t] where δi,li(t) < δi,t. Finally, Lemma 4
guarantees that a convincing rationalization exists. Q.E.D.
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Note that [B] in Theorem 5 specifies a linear program, so it is solvable and computa-
tionally simpler than the nonlinear program specified in Theorem 4.
Instead of testing for Cournot rationalizability with nondecreasing marginal costs, the
modeler may wish to restrict firms to have constant marginal costs. It is quite clear that
Cournot rationalizability with this added requirement is equivalent to the following: there
exists positive scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T that satisfy (9) and δi,t = δi,t′ for all t and t′ in T .
We leave the reader to verify this claim.
(2) Nonincreasing Marginal Costs. Suppose that we want the data set to be Cournot
rationalizable, with all firms having nonincreasing marginal costs. We claim that this is
possible if and only if there exists positive scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T such that (a) for each
firm i and observation t, the condition (16) holds, with ∆i,t = δi,t, (b) (9) holds for every
t ∈ T , and (c) δj,t′ ≤ δj,t whenever Qj,t′ > Qj,t.
It is not hard to see that conditions (a)-(c) are necessary. If such a rationalization
exists, then we may choose δi,t = C¯
′
i(Qi,t), so (b) is satisfied because of (8) and (c) is
satisfied because C¯ ′i is nonincreasing. That C¯
′
i is nonincreasing also guarantees that
δi,t = C¯
′
i(Qi,t) ≤
∫ Qt
Qli(t)
C¯ ′i(q) dq
Qt −Qli(t)
,
so that (a) holds because of (5). We shall skip the proof that (a)-(c) are sufficient; this
could be obtained by a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorems 4 or 5.
(3) A weaker version of the convincing criterion. An obvious weakening of the con-
vincing criterion is to retain condition (C2), i.e., C¯ ′i has minimal variation, but to modify
(C1) by requiring that C¯ ′i(Qi,t) be in the interval [kmin{Mi,t,Mi,ui(t)}, K max{Mi,t,Mi,ui(t)}],
where Mi,t is defined by (15) and k and K are chosen by the modeler, with 0 < k < 1 <
K < ∞. Such a generalization of the convincing criterion will not affect the qualitative
nature of the results in this paper It is completely straightforward to check that the neces-
sary sufficient conditions for this modified version of convincing rationalizability are given
by (a) and (b) in Theorem 4, and the following:
δi,t ∈ [kmin{∆i,t,∆i,ui(t)}, K max{∆i,t,∆i,ui(t)}] for all t 6= t∗∗i .
Like Theorem 4, and for the same reason, this program is nonlinear but solvable.
(4) Bounds on Marginal Costs. Without knowing the precise costs incurred by the
firm, the modeler may nonetheless know enough to impose some bounds on marginal
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costs. For example, suppose that it knows that for firm i, marginal costs lies between bi
and Bi. In that case, it is clear that Cournot rationalizability, with bi ≤ C¯ ′i(q) ≤ Bi for
all i and q > 0, is possible if and only if (a) and (b) in Theorem 4 are satisfied, and
bi ≤ δi,t, ∆i,t ≤ Bi.
Note that this specifies a linear program.
5. Cournot Rationalizability with Demand and Cost
Fluctuations
Until now, we have assumed that the set of observations is generated by changes to the
demand function and that firms’ cost functions are unchanged across the entire set of
observations. In this section, we show how observed fluctuations to costs of a particular
type can be dealt with easily within the framework we have set up. To be specific, we
shall assume that, in addition to Pt and Qi,t (for all i ∈ I), the observer also knows
that firm i’s marginal cost has shifted by Ai,t at observation t. We may normalize the
fluctuations so Ai,1 = 0 for all i; in other words, the change in marginal cost for each
firm is measured against its value at t = 1. Note that Ai,t may take positive or negative
values. Cost changes of this kind are common; for example, they arise if the output is
taxed and the tax rate changes across observations. Or they may arise from observed
changes to the cost of a raw material that is used at a constant rate in the production
process.14 Formally, the set of observations is {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ai,t)i∈I ]}t∈T ; this set is said
to be generic if Qi,t′ 6= Qi,t whenever t 6= t′. It is Cournot rationalizable if we can find a
regular demand function, P¯t, for each observation t, and a regular cost function, C¯i, for
each firm i, such that
(i) P¯t(
∑
i∈I Qi,t) = Pt;
(ii) C¯ ′i(qi) + Ai,t > 0 for all qi ≥ 0; and
(iii) argmaxqi≥0[qiP¯t(qi +
∑
j 6=iQj,t)− C¯i(qi)− Ai,tqi] = Qi,t.
In short, (Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I), is the Cournot outcome when each firm i has the increasing cost
function Cˆi,t(qi) = C¯i(qi) + Ai,tqi and the market inverse demand function is P¯t. A
rationalization for {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ai,t)i∈I ]}t∈T is convincing if the cost functions C¯i satisfy
the convincing criterion, i.e., the conditions (C1) and (C2), with Mi,t given by (15). Note
also that while linear cost shocks are observed, we are assuming here that the ‘permanent’
part of the cost function C¯ remains completely unknown; it is not hard to modify the
14 For example, in the case of Genesove and Mullin (1998), this is the price of raw sugar.
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exposition to deal with the case (like in Section 3) where costs at equilibrium outputs are
observed and we shall leave that to the reader.
The next result should not be surprising given Theorem 4.
Theorem 6. A generic set of observations {[Pt, (Qi,t)i∈I , (Ai,t)i∈I ]}t∈T (with Ai,1 = 0 for
i ∈ I) is convincingly Cournot rationalizable if, and only if, the following three conditions
are satisfied:
(a) there exists scalars {∆i,t}(i,t)∈I×T , with ∆i,t > −mins∈T Ai,s,15 such that, for each firm
i and observation t,∑
s∈(Li(t)∪{t})\(Li(t′)∪{t′})
(∆i,s + Ai,t)
(
Qi,s −Qi,l(s)
)
< Pt(Qi,t −Qi,t′) for t′ ∈ Li(t); (20)
(b) there exists scalars {δi,t}(i,t)∈I×T , with δi,t > −mins∈T Ai,s, that satisfy
Pt − δ1,t − A1,t
Q1,t
=
Pt − δ2,t − A2,t
Q2,t
= . . . =
Pt − δI,t − Al,t
QI,t
> 0 for each t ∈ T ; and (21)
(c)
δi,t lies between ∆i,t and ∆i,ui(t) for all t 6= t∗∗i . (22)
Proof: We shall only outline the argument since it is similar to those provided for The-
orems 2 and 4.
If a convincing rationalization exists, set δi,t = C¯i(Qi,t) and
∆i,t =
∫ Qt
Qli(t)
C¯ ′i(q)dq
Qt −Qli(t)
.
Both ∆i,t and δi,t are strictly greater than −mins∈T Ai,s since C¯ ′i +Ai,t > 0 for all t. The
condition (a) must hold since it is just a version of the marginal property (see (5) and (b)
must hold since it follows from the first order condition (see the argument leading up to
(8). Lastly, since the observations are convincingly rationalizable, (22) must hold.
For the other direction, since (a) holds we may (fictitiously) assume that cost at Qi,t
is observable, with
Ci,t =
∑
s∈(Li(t)∪{t})\{0}
∆i,s
(
Qi,s −Qi,li(s)
)
. (23)
Then (20) simply says that the marginal property holds (after taking into account the
cost fluctuation). By adapting the argument of Lemma 3, we can conclude that there are
15 Since Ai,1 = 0, we must have ∆i,t > 0.
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regular cost functions C¯i : R+ → R such that (i) C¯i(Qi,t) = Ci,t; (ii) C¯ ′i(Qi,t) = δi,t; and
(iii) for all qi in [0, Qi,t),
Ptqi − C¯i(qi)− Ai,tqi < PtQi,t − C¯i(Qi,t)− Ai,tQi,t. (24)
Furthermore, C¯i may be chosen such that C¯
′
i(0) = δi,0 for any δi,0 > 0 and C¯
′
i varies min-
imally. If we choose δi,0 > −mins∈T Ai,s, then the fact that δi,t and ∆i,t are also greater
than −mins∈T Ai,s by assumption means that C¯i may be chosen such that C¯ ′i + Ai,t > 0
for all (i, t). Note that C¯i satisfies the convincing criterion since it satisfies (C2) (minimal
variation) and also (C1) (because of condition (c)). Since (b) holds and C¯i obeys (i)-(iii),
Lemma 4 guarantees the existence of regular inverse demand functions Pt that rationalizes
the observed outputs at each observation. Q.E.D.
In Section 4, we considered various restrictions that could be imposed on the ratio-
nalizing cost functions, as an alternative (or in addition) to the convincing criterion, and
developed tests for these restrictions. It is entirely straightforward (given Section 4) to
carry out a similar exercise in this context; we leave the details to the reader.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: Define g(q) = k(q−Qt) + δt. The graph of g is a line, with positive slope
k that passes through the point (Qt, δt). Since αt < Pt, there is k > 0 and  > 0 such that,
Pt > g(Qt − ) and for q in the interval [Qt − ,Qt), we have
g(q) > C¯ ′(q). (25)
For q in [0, Qt − ], there exists ζ > 0 such that
Pq − C¯(q) < PQt − C¯(Qt) for Pt < P < Pt + ζ; (26)
this follows from property (iii) in Lemma 1
Instead of constructing P¯t directly, we shall specify the function P¯ ′t ; P¯t can then be obtained
by integration. We denote the marginal revenue function induced by P¯t by m¯t; i.e., m¯t(q) =
P¯ ′t(q)q + P¯t(q). We first consider the construction of P¯ ′t in the interval [0, Qt]. Choose P¯ ′t
with the following properties: (a) P¯ ′t(Qt) = (δt − Pt)/Qt (which is equivalent to the first order
condition m¯t(Qt) = C¯ ′(Qt) = δt), (b) P¯ ′t is negative, decreasing and concave in [0, Qt], and (c)∫ Qt
0 P¯
′
t(q)dq = Pt−P¯t(0) > −ζ and (d) P¯ ′t(Qt−) is sufficiently close to zero so that m¯t(Qt−) >
g(Qt − ). Property (b) guarantees that m¯t is decreasing and concave. This fact, together with
(a) and (d), ensures that m¯t(q) > g(q) for q in [Qt − ,Qt); together with (25), we obtain
m¯t(q) > C¯ ′(q) for q in [Qt− ,Qt). Therefore, in the interval [Qt− ,Qt], profit is maximized at
q = Qt. Because of (c), Pt < P¯t(q) < Pt + ζ, so by (26), P¯t(q)q − C¯(q) < PtQt − C¯(Qt) for q in
[0, Qt − ].
To recap, we have constructed P¯ ′t (and hence P¯t) such that with this inverse demand function,
profit st Qt is higher than at any output below Qt. We now need to specify P¯ ′t for q > Qt such
that profit at q = Qt is higher than at any output level above Qt. It suffices to have P¯t such
that, for q > Qt,
m¯t(q) = P¯ ′t(q)q + P¯t(q) < C¯
′(q),
so marginal cost always exceeds marginal revenue for q > Qt. Provided P¯t is decreasing, it
suffices to have P¯ ′t(q)q + Pt < C¯ ′(q), which is equivalent to
−P¯ ′t(q) >
Pt − C¯ ′(q)
q
(27)
The right side of this inequality is a continuous function of q; clearly we can choose P¯ ′t < 0 such
that (27) holds for q > Qt. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: This is broadly similar to the proof of Lemma 2 except that we must
now take into account the fact that there is more than one firm. For each firm i, define gi(qi) =
ki(qi−Qi,t) + δi,t. The graph of gi is a line, with positive slope ki that passes through the point
(Qi,t, δi,t). Since δi,t < Pt, there is  > 0 and ki (for i ∈ calI) such that, Pt > gi(Qi,t − ) and
for qi in the interval [Qi,t − ,Qi,t), we have
gi(qi) > C¯ ′i(qi). (28)
For qi in [0, Qi,t − ], there exists ζ > 0 such that
Pqi − C¯i(qi) < PQi,t − C¯i(Qi,t) for Pt < P < Pt + ζ; (29)
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t his follows from property (iii) in Lemma 3. Note that ζ is common across all firms.
We shall specify the function P¯ ′t , so P¯t can be obtained by integration. Holding the output
of firm j (for j 6= i) at Qj,t, we denote the marginal revenue function for firm i by m¯i,t; i.e.,
m¯i,t(qi) = P¯ ′t(
∑
j 6=iQj,t+qi)qi+P¯t(
∑
j 6=iQj,t+qi). We first consider the construction of P¯
′
t in the
interval [0, Qt], where Qt =
∑
i∈I Qi,t. Choose P¯
′
t with the following properties: (a) P¯
′
t(Qt) =
(δi,t − Pt)/Qi,t (which is equivalent to the first order condition m¯i,t(Qi,t) = C¯ ′i(Qi,t) = δi,t; note
that there is no ambiguity here because of (9)), (b) P¯ ′t is negative, decreasing and concave in
[0, Qt], (c)
∫ Qt
0 P¯
′
t(q)dq = Pt − P¯t(0) > −ζ and (d) P¯ ′t(Qt − ) is sufficiently close to zero so that
m¯i,t(Qi,t − ) > gi(Qi,t − ). Property (b) guarantees that m¯i,t is decreasing and concave (as a
function of qi). This fact, together with (a) and (d), ensures that m¯i,t(qi) > gi(qi) for all i and
qi in [Qi,t − ,Qi,t); combining with (28), we obtain m¯i,t(qi) > C¯ ′i(q). Therefore, in the interval
[Qi,t − ,Qi,t], firm i’s profit is maximized at qi = Qi,t. Because of (c), Pt < P¯t(q) < Pt + ζ, so
by (29), P¯t(
∑
j 6=iQj,t + qi)qi − C¯i(qi) < PtQi,t − C¯i(Qi,t) for qi in [0, Qi,t − ].
To recap, we have constructed P¯ ′t (and hence P¯t) such that, with this inverse demand func-
tion, firm i’s profit at Qi,t is higher than at any output below Qi,t, so long as other firms are
producing
∑
j 6=iQj,t. Our next step is to show how to specify P¯
′
t for q > Qt in such a way that
firm i’s profit at qi = Qi,t is higher than at any output level above Qi,t (for every firm i). It
suffices to have P¯t such that, for qi > Qi,t,
m¯i,t(qi) = P¯ ′t(
∑
j 6=i
Qj,t + qi)qi + P¯t(
∑
j 6=i
Qj,t + qi) < C¯ ′i(qi),
so firm i’s marginal cost always exceeds its marginal revenue for qi > Qi,t. Provided P¯t is
decreasing, it suffices to have P¯ ′t(
∑
j 6=iQj,t + qi)qi + Pt < C¯
′
i(qi), which is equivalent to
−P¯ ′t(
∑
j 6=i
Qj,t + qi) >
Pt − C¯ ′i(qi)
qi
for all firms i.
This can be re-written as
−P¯ ′t(Qt + x) >
Pt − C¯ ′i(Qi,t + x)
Qi,t + x
for x > 0 and all firms i (30)
The right side of this inequality is a finite collection of continuous functions of x and at x = 0,
the two sides are equal to each other (because of (9)). Clearly we can choose P¯ ′t < 0 such that
(30) holds for x > 0. Q.E.D.
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